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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a concept which helps in understanding the Command and
Control (C2) process associated with a well-trained team of military
commanders each being an expert in problem-solving in his particular
tactical warfare area, and has been delegated C2 responsibility and
authority over his resources by his superior commander. It is argued
that due to his individual training a commander develops a principal
expert model (PEM) of the warfare area in which he has specialized, which
allows him to make superior tactical C2 decisions based upon the tactical
information available to him. In addition, as a consequence of central-
ized mission planning and team-training of the entire C2 organization,
each commander develops aggregated mutual expert models (MEM) of the
PEM's of the commanders that he strongly interacts with and competes for
common team resources. This concept is refered to as the expert team
of experts (ETOE) methodology.
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77-C-0532 (NR 041-519)by AFOSR Contract 80-0229 and by the Naval Electronic
Systems Command under Contracts N00039-80-C-0390 and N00039-81-C-0243.
This paper was presented at the 4th MIT/ONR Workshop on C3 Systems, San
Diego, CA, June 1981.
1. Introduction
The motivation for the ideas presented in this paper arose from the
increased tendency to decentralize the military C2 process in complex
tactical situations involving several types of warfare. An excellent
example of such doctrinal changes is the so-called Composite Warfare Com-
mander (CWC) C2 doctrine for Naval battle group operations; the CWC doctrine
has been used by the U.S. Pacific Fleet for the past several years, and
in April 1981 it was adopted by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) as the
doctrine for all U.S. Naval battle group operations. Similar attempts to
decentralize the C2 process are under examination by other services. A
more decentralized method [1; p.13] for artillery fire direction is being
developed by theU.S. Army Field Artillery School to reduce reactions times.
Similarly the U.S. Marine Corps are investigating the distribution of the
C2 process for increased survivability 12].
This trend toward decentralization of the C2 tactical decision making
function and the geographical distribution of specialist warfare commanders
(WC) is primarily driven by technological advances in sensor and weapons
systems; more "things" are moving faster and quiter;but sensors can see further
thus necessitating rapid decision-making for the detection, classification,
and localization of an enemy threat. In addition, geographical distribution
of the WC's offers some protection from simultaneous destruction of the global
C2 process, by tactical (nuclear or conventional) weapons.
The decentralization of the C process would be efficient, and would
require a minimum of tactical radio communications for force coordination
if the decisions of a particular WC regarding the location, motion, and
function of the physical assets assigned to him did not influence to any
significant degree the decisions and objectives of other WC's and vice-versa.
However, this is almost never the case in modern warfare. In spite of
careful mission planning, due to unforseen enemy tactics one WC may need
more assets than he has to successfully carry out his individual mission and
thereby contributing to the success of the overall mission.
The asset reassignment problem is only one example that points out the
required coordination between distinct WC's. A more subtle interaction
takes place when at least one particular asset has significant cabability in
more than one warfare area. We list two examples to illustrate this point.
Example 1. In an Air Force context think of close air support (CAS) and
interdiction (INT) as two separate warfare areas. Consider two specialist
commanders one who is an expert in CAS tactics (call him CASC) and another
who is an expert in INT (call him INTC). Particular aircraft, such as an
F-16, can be used for either CAS or INT or both depending on the mix of
armament that they are loaded with. One can imagine tactical scenarios in
which the CAS problems in a sector suddenly becomes much more critical than
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the corresponding INT problem. In this case if the C organization was
set up right, and if the INTC had a reasonable aggregated version of the
CASC's problem, then he could command one or more CAS-capable F-16, under
his control to carry out a CAS mission without necessarily relinquishing
his C2 authority over these aircraft.
Example 2. Modern ships tend to have significant cababilities in all Naval
warfare areas , namely antisubmarine warfare (ASW), antisurface warfare
(ASUW), and antiair warfare (AAW) both with respect to the sensors (passive
and active sonar, radar, etc.) as well as the weapon systems. Normally, a
TASS equiped destroyer will be assigned to the ASW commander (ASWC), while
a cruiser will be assigned to the AAW commander (AAWC). However, although
the motion of the destroyer will be controlled by the ASWC, nonetheless the
destroyer can still carry out AAW function (radar surveillance, fire SAM's)
and hence it certainly impacts the AAWC's problem. Similarly, the motion of
a guided-missile cruiser will be controlled by the AAWC, but the cruiser
can still carry out ASW functions (sonar search, fire torpedo, etc.) and
thereby it is very much a contributor to the ASWC's problem. If the AAW
threat increases significantly, the AAWC can ask to relinguish control of a
particular ship (say, an AAW capable destroyer); the ASWC may or may not
grant this request, and the CWC may veto the ship exchange (or lack of
exchange).
The above examples demonstrate some very important issues that arise
when coordination among WC's is desirable and beneficial in a decentralized
C2 tactical decision making environment. Assuming that such coordination
is desirable so as to maximize to the extent possible the warfare effectiveness
of a limited set of assets, each with a multiwarfare cabability, it
certainly follows that:
(!) The C2 organization must adopt a tactical doctrine that
encourages such coordination of multiwarfare-capable as-
sets, while preserving the C2 responsibility and authority
delegated to subordinate WC's.
(2) The physical C3 system must provide the appropriate information
to each WC so that not only he can make superior decisions in
his own warfare area, but also coordinate with other WC's
especially in the motion and utilization of multiwarfare-
capable assets.
The problem is clearly very complex. From a scientific point of view
it certainly contains subproblems of decision-making under stochastic
dynamic uncertainty. Also, it certainly represents a distributed**decision
problem. It contains elements of decision-making by individual human
Admiral Doyle's directive is in fact to have each ship have increased cabability
in their secondary warfare areas.
**
The word "distributed" in this paper is used in the same sense as "decentralized
with coordination".
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decision makers, the warfare commanders. It is also a problem in distributed
team decision making. There are several interfaces between mean and machines;
the quality of the collective tactical warfare decisions will clearly depend
upon the real-time tactical information generated by intelligence and by
sensors organic to the organization. The effectiveness of the tactical
decisions will certainly impact the targeting of the weapons systems; delays
between decision making and weapons release significantly degrade any
reasonable measure of effectiveness (MOE).
In short, the tactical military command and control problem is a very
challenging one. The absence of a "C2 theory" has been recently recognized
[4] as a significant gap in the system theory and system engineering dis-
ciplines. The lack of systematic methodologies for evaluating C3 systems
hinders the development of high-quality and meaningful specifications for
C3 I related procurements. Technological advances in sensors, computers,
and weapons systems may indeed require changes in tactics; how to train
WC's and how to evolve C2 doctrine in response to such technological
advances is (or should be) a major issue for concern.
2. Some Definitions
The works "command-and-control (C2 )", "command, control, and communications
C3 )", "command, control, communications and intelligence C3 I)" have dif-
ferent meanings to different people, and their indiscriminate use can
create a great degree of confusion. For this reason, in this paper some
distinction between the C2 and C3 terms will be made.
C Process: The means by which a team of human military commanders make
decisions that relate to the deployment and motion of the resources and
assets assigned to them to carry-out a military mission specified by higher
authority.
C Authority and Responsibility: This refers to the fact that a particular
commander can instruct, direct, position, move and, in general, control the
human and physical assets assigned to him by his superior commander. His
responsibility is to accomplish the specific objectives spelled out to him
by his superior commander.
C Organization: The semihierarchical way and organizational rules by which
the human commanders organize themselves in terms of C2 authority and res-
ponsibility by warfare are and/or geographical sector. Rules of engagement
and tactical doctrine are an integral part of the C2 organization.
We remark that in this paper we shall use the term C2 to primarily relate
to human decision making. Obviously commanders need real-time information to
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make decisions, and weapons systems that eventually implement a subset
of their decisions. This leads us to the following definitions:
C3 System Elements: The physical and technological hardware and software
that generate, manipulate, communicate, and display information and the
weapon systems. Thus typical C3 System Elements are
(a) Sensors (Fixed or Moving)
(b) Communication Links (mostly radio for tactical
C2) and related devices
(c) Computers and Displays (hardware, software, firmware,
decision aids) viewed as systems
(d) Weapon platforms and weapons systems.
C System: The physical system and its architecture that defines the inter-
connection of the C elements. Thus it is the C system that
(a) generates data and information for different WC's'in
the C2 organization
(b) allows for coordination among several WC's
(c) provides means for implementing the decisions generated
by the C2 process.
3. Some General Issues
It should be noted that the physical elements of the C3 system as well
as the WC's are naturally and/or intentionally geographically distributed;
geographic distribution reduces the vulnerability of the C2 organization and
of the C3 system to enemy attack but strains the radio communication requirements*
necessary for coordination among WC's and to carry out the C2 process.
Figure 2.1 represents a highly simplified schematic of the C process
interacting with the C3 system. It represents a highly multivariable dynamic
and stochastic feedback control process or a cybernetic process. The emphasis
of Fig. 2.1 is upon the functions of the organic C3 system as providing infor-
mation (not data!) to the C2 organization and acting as an actuator or effector
that suitably transforms the collective decisions of the WC's into physical
events.
Radio Communications bandwidth is the most precious and vulnerable element in
the C3 system because of its susceptibility to jamming. Spread spectrum tech-
niques can reduce the jamining vulnerability but there is just so much bandwidth
in the universe.UHF communications are less susceptible to enemy intercepts and
localization, but constrain the system to line-of-sight communications.
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arenthetically we remark that the inclusion of weapons as part of
the C system is not a widely accepted convention. It is the author's
opinion that they must be included since at a minimum they will generate
tracks at a subset of sensors and they must be sorted out from the energy
and neutral objects and targets. Also, when we consider coordination
problem among WC's with respect to proper utilization of multiwarfare-
capable assets, it becomes very difficult to define multiwarfare-cabability
at a systems level without explicit consideration of the weapons systems
that are carried in that asset. Finally, the whole issue of fratricide
cannot be addressed in the absence of weapons.
Figure 2.2 illustrates in a different way the interactions of the C
process with the C3 system. What we attempt to highlight in Fig. 2.2 is
the need for a harmonious relationship between the C2 organization and
the C3 system architecture. The "flood" of information that can be
generated by technological advances in sensor technology cannot be indis-
criminately be communicated to each WC that may be represented by a node
in the C2 organization. Conversely, the diverse decisions generated by the
C2 process should not be indiscriminately be communicated to the C3 elements.
Many of the current tactical C3 system architectures bring all the
information into a centralized computer; it is very doubtfull that such a
system C3 architecture can support a very distributed C2 organization, even
ignoring the vulnerability of a centralized computer. The tactical com-
munications requirements would be immense, and the delays* totally
unacceptable.
It is the author's assertion that at the present time we do not have
(and probably neither the "bad guys") a systematic, analytical, quantitative
methodology that can be used to:
(1) Analyze the interactions between a fixed C2 organization
and a fixed C3 system architecture, and develop really
meaningful and relevant MOE's.
(2) Synthesize "harmonious topologies" of a distributed C
organization and a distributed C3 system architectures,
so that meaningful and relevant MOE's become"sufficiently
good" or even "optimal"
What we do have is:
(1) Huge computer simulations
(2) Semi-artificial war games
(3) Military exercises
It is the author's opinion that the 'delay between the occurence of a hostile
event by an enemy asset and the time to put "iron" on that enemy asset is
the primary C2 /C3 MOE.
-6-
What we have is valuable, but not enough; they are necessary but by no
means sufficient. What we need is a "C2 theory" which will complement
what we can do now, and provide solid theoretical guidance on ways that
C2 /C3 analyses and syntheses should be carried out.
SO WE NEED A C /C THEORY!
4. Why a C 2/C3 Theory is Hard!
Before one can synthesize a harmonious C3 architecture to support a dis-
tributed C2 organization one must develop at the very least a rudimentary
analytical cabability.
The analysis of any complex system requires a set of elements together
with a mathematical description of what they do; these can be thought of
cause-and-effect relations (or input-output or stimulus-response). The
relations may be static or dynamic, deterministic or stochastic. Another
requirement is that of a system topology which describes how the basic
elements are interconnected. Next one requires a set of consistent variables
and rules which define how the output of an element becomes the input to
another, description of serial, parallel, and feedback relationships. All
of the above allow a global system description by a set of consistent variables
and mathematical expressions.
Given such analysis tools one can carry qualitative and quantitative
analyses at the system level; for example, global stimulus-response dynamic
characteristics can be deduced. Sensitivity analyses can be used to isolate
bottlenecks and pinpoint to vulnerable C2 /C3 system elements. MOE's can be
defined and evaluated as functions (or function(s) of the consistent variables.
Validation studies can be carried out provided that data is available.
Given an analytical model of the type that was described above synthesis
questions can be posed. Thus optimization techniques can be used to improve
selected MOE's. Impact of alternate C2 organizations and/or C3 system
architectures can be quantified.
There are several stumbling blocks in the development of models for
the generic elements of the C2 /C3 system, and the main difficulty stems
from the distributed nature inherent in a C2/C3 system. Even in the sur-
veillance area in which the sensor (radars, sonars, HFDF's,ESM gear etc.)
characteristics are well understood from a physical and engineering viewpoint,
the problem of distributed detection arises and requires advances at a purely
conceptual and mathematical level; some new (often counterintuitive) phenomena
arise in distributed detection theory that have no counterparts in classical
detection theory (see ref. [ 4 1 for a very simple example). Within the
surveillance area, the theory and algorithms necessary to solve the multiple-
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target problem, including issues of data association and false
measurements has not been resolved.
The same theoretical bottlenecks arise in almost every part of the
C3 system. For tactical radio data communication networks one must develop
theories and algorithms for distributed routing and flow control for net-
works with changing topology, i.e. nodes and links may dissappear and
reappear due to line-of-sight considerations. Issues of imbedding a re-
dundant distributed data base within a changing radio communication network
have received very little attention.
All of the above issues do impact the time delay between the occurence
of an event (say position and identity of an object) and the presentation
of this information to the appropriate warfare commander.
Although the distributed nature of the physical C system requires
advances in theory and algorithms before analysis and design can be
really carried out, it is the author's opinion that the most difficult
stumbling block relates to the appropriate modeling of the human commanders
in the C2 organization. Since the whole purpose of the physical C3 system
is to provide information to the C2 organization and to implement the
decisions generated by the C2 process, such an interface cannot be ignored.
Thus, at the most rudimentary level we need to model the information-
processing and decision-making processes associated with:
(a) a single military decisionmaker,
(b) a warfare commander (WC) augmented by his staff, and
(c) the entire C2 process by a team of cooperating WC's
with a C2 organization.
To successfully develop models for the C process generated by the distributed
c2 organization one needs to blend system theory and cognitive psychology
concepts. It is argued that unless we develop suitable models for the C
The author's definition of system theory is broad; it includes all disciplines
that relate to normative aspects of decision theory. Thus traditional dis-
ciplines that form system theory include: detection theory, estimation theory,
control theory, game theory, operations research, communication theory,
information theory, statistical decision theory, certain parts of computer
science, and artificial intelligence in particular. As Simon [ 5 ,p.497]
points out "...Artificial Intelligence is a normative discipline. Like operations
research, its goal is to find powerful problem-solving algorithms, and no holds
are barred. In fact, there is no real boundary between these disciplines, and
today the theory of heuristic search is being pursued vigorously by both."
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process we will never be able to develop suitable tools that will help
us analyze current C2/C3 systems, point the way for superior evolutionary
changes (through changes in hardware or doctrine) in existing C2/C3 systems,
and synthesize superior future C2/C3 systems that can meet advanced threats
and take advantage of technological innovation in C3 elements.
5. Models for Commanders in C Organizations
Modeling the behavior of human beings is a subject that has an enormous
literature and certainly gives rise to very controversial arguments. To
clearly delineate the boundaries, the author wishes to stress that the need
for models that represent the information processing and decision making
of a commander should be restricted to the fundamental issues of military
warfare "Did the military objective got accomplished?" "Did we shoot down
or drove away his airplanes?" "Were we successful in protecting the carrier
from submarine threat?" etc.,etc.
2 2In military C organizations Warfare Commanders are delegated C
authority and responsibility by their superior- commander because of the
complexity of modern warfare. If the superior commander made all the
tactical decisions in a superior manner then he would be required to
(a) absorb, and interpret all the tactical information
(b) be a true expert tactician in all warfare areas
(c) have a sufficient amount of time to correlate correctly
the real-time information with the tactics that he
has stored in his brain to arrive at the correct decisions.
All of the above exceed the fundamental limitations of even super-intelligent
well-motivated and well-trained human beings. The main limitations of a human
are summarized as follows:
Short Term Memory Limitations. These show up repeatedly in learning and
decision making (problem solving) experiments as to the amount of information
that can be stored in the highly serial short term memory (STM). In a
classic paper Miller [ 6 ] argued that approximately seven independent
"items" can be stored in STM. Simon [ 7 ,p.81] refers to these items as
"chunks" because some "chunks" contain easily correlated information
than others; for example, if the items are three letter English words
the two words "DOG" and "FKN" correspond to four chunks !!DOG!' and !!F"
The retention of 5 to 9 "chunks" in STM is true only if no other
spurious activity or task, however simple, is interposed between the human
subjectshearing the items and repeating them, then the number of retained
chunks drops down to 2 [7, p.81].
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The above strongly supports the clear preferences of military
commanders to see the disposition of their military forces, and those of
the enemy in a geographical plot. In naval battle groups a "chunk" may
represent a pattern of warships with respect to a carrier; the same in-
formation presented in numerical longitude and latitude format would
saturate the STM.
Learning Time: Once we have a "chunk" in the STM, then it takes 2-10 seconds
(average about 5 seconds) to learn this chunk in the sense of placing it
in the long term memory (LTM) [7, p.77].
Long-Term Memory (LTM): The human LTM is essentially infinite; there is
no evidence that human beings have an upper bound on what they can learn.
It is a highly associative memory with information stored in interlinked
list structures, with extensive cross-referencing and indexing [7, p. 104].
In the case of a military commander all the relevant information that he
brings to bear is stored in his LTM (tactics, prefereable asset distributions,
effectiveness of weapons, etc.). An expert WC becomes trained by the ac-
cumulated experience gained through training, war games, exercises, etc.
Retrieval Time From LTM: Information stored in LTM can be retrieved
relatively quickly; retrieval times range from about 50 milliseconds
to 2 seconds.
The limitations of the human brain lead to the fact that even a highly
motivated well trained human has his limitations, and these are primarily
reflected to notions of human bounded rationality [51-[8] and the fact
that men are satisficers rather than optimizers (in the strict system
theoretic sense). Simon [7, p. 36] asserts that "what a person cannot do
he will not do, no matter how much he wants to do it". This leads to the
notion of satisficing solutions which represent "good enough" decision
but not mathematically optimal ones. Because of the limitations of the
STM and any decision deadlines (which are prevelent in tactical warfare)
the human is incapable in general of arriving at mathematically optimal
solutions. Simon [5, p. 503] however, states that ".., accumulated experience
is indeed a very large component of high-level skill... . This accumulation
of experience may allow people to behave in ways that are very nearly
optimal in situations to which their experience is pertinent, but will be
of little help when genuinely novel situations are presented. That conclusion
is consistent with our general belief that the limits of human rationality
become particularly important in explaining behavior under uncertainty where
we translate "uncertainty" here to mean any kind of significant novelty."
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Keeping in mind the fact that tactical military decision making is
carried out only in the context of a C2 organization, it is very very dif-
ficult, if not outright impossible, to develop an empirical and repeatable
data base on the basis of which empirical models of the decision process carried
out by a single warfare commander can be developed. For example, consider the
naval war games that take place at the Naval War College in Newport,
R.I. In such war games it is easy to quantify the final outcome of a
naval engagement in terms of the initial and remaining assets. However,
it is very difficult to properly define intermediate "epochs" in which
the collective decisions, even before the battle starts, have given one
side a particular advantage, and to use the empirical data so as to assess
the quality of the human decisions that lead to a particular epoch.
It is the author's contention that we need to develop normative models
to explain and quantify the decision process of a warfare commander, with
particular emphasis upon his interactions with the tactical information
provided to him by the physical C3 system and his assigned mission within
the C2 organization.
The author proposes the term humoptimization as the process by which
normative optimization-based models which actively reflect human limitations,
such as bounded rationality and "the human is a satisficer, " into the
constraints of a suitable mathematical optimization problem. This type of
constrained optimization problem must reflect
(1) the expertise of a well-trained warfare commander to
arrive at superior tactical decisions in his own
warfare area,
(2) the constraints imposed by the STM and its interactions
with the LTM, and
(3) stochastic elements that reflect and capture the variability
of the human decision making process.
Figure 5.1 illustrates in a highly simplified manner what a normative model,
based on humoptimization, should capture. The set of decisions generated
by such a model must be within the set of the satisficing solutions. The
limitations of the STM would limit the search strategies in the tree generated
by alternative hypotheses generation-response selection mechanism, and
introduce a certain degree of stochastic variability in the humoptimization
solution.
It is important to stress that such normative models of warfare com-
manders cannot be developed in a vacuum; they must be developed in the
context of the physical C3 system. An expert naval anti-air warfare (AAW)
commander would not do a very good job if all of a sudden 100 Backfires
appeared 50 miles from the carrier; this would represent a "novel" situation.
However, such an event is extremely unlikely; it is precisely the intelligence
and surveillance function of the C3 system to prevent having the AAW commander
having to face such novel situations.
There do exist normative humoptimization models of human decision
making that have been validated. For the past decade several such models
that accurately model the human as an element of a control system (e.g.
landing an airplane, pointing an AAA weapon etc.) have been developed
using the tools of stochastic dynamic optimization theory incorporating
human perceptual and neuromuscular constraints; see, for example,
Kleinman [ 9 1 and Levinson and Baron 110]. More recently Kleinman et
al [11] have developed and.validated a dynamic decision-oriented model of
a well-trained human who is faced with carrying out several dynamic and
stochastic tasks, under decision deadlines; once more the tools of stochastic
dynamic optimization were used. Needless to say a great deal of basic and
applied research is needed to develop the normative humoptimization-based
models of different warfare commanders, and to validate them, that are
needed to model the interactions of the C2/CJ process.
We shall refer to such normative models of an individual warfare com-
mander as his Principal Expert Model (PEM). The PEM reflects the superior
(expertise) of a well-trained commander to make tactical decisions in the
warfare area/sector of his C2 authority and responsibility.
Figure 5.2 illustrates the key elements of the PEM. The "blocks"
within the PEM are those that must be reflected in the humoptimization model.
1) The Model of the World in the area of the WC expertise
must include as a minimum the disposition of his own
assets, enemy assets, and cababilities of the sensor and
weapon systems under his control. His mental model in
his LTM will be updated by tactical information, processed
by his STM. The tactical information and the interaction
between STM and LTM leads to a small set of alternate
hypotheses which correspond to situation assessment. One
can indeed argue that one of the key functions of the
physical C3 system would be to provide quality and timely
information to the WC so as to minimize the situation
assessment hypotheses (through reduction in uncertainty)
since the generation of multiple "what is going on"
hypotheses stresses the limitations of the STM.
2) Based on the situation assessment a set of decision options
must be generated and eventually a particular decision option
is selected. This process clearly involves the correlation
of tactical training stored in LTM and is influenced by.;
(a) the objective function which abstracts the mission
responsibility and objectives dictated by his
superior commander,
(b) the planning horizon that dictates the time-urgency
of the WC's tactical decisions,
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(c) any constraints on his allowable decisions
imposed by the C2 organizations (rules of
engagement, EMCON status, use of tactical
nuclear weapons etc.),
(d) Available resources (platforms, sensors, weapons
etc.) and dynamic constraints (speed,
maneuvarability).
Obviously the decision option generation is one of the most complex
aspects of human decision making. It has been claimed* that
experienced commanders tend to generate fewer options as compared
to more novice commanders. This can only be explained that superior
tactics are better organized as "patterns" in the expert com-
mander's LTM, thus minimizing the "chunks" that are transfered
in the STM.
It should be noted that the above qualitative description of the
Principal Expert Model (PEM) represents a mild extension of the SHOR model
(Stimulus-Hypothesis-Option-Response) proposed by Wohl [12]. Once more the
quality6 of the information presented by the physical C3 system can have a
significant impact upon the decision option generation process. For example,
gridlock errors among different surveillance platforms can cause a single
target to appear as two or more targets; the WC must assess this possibility
in his option generation and selection. Similarly any delay in communicating
a weapons-release command to the actual weapon release will influence the
tactical decision process,
The PEM must be by necessity a detailed model and even in a single
warfare area the amount of tactical information may saturate a single WC;
it is for this reason that a major WC is augmented by his staff to avoid
information overload. This has led Boetcher and Levis [ 13] to develop
information-theoretic models of humans.
The normative models that represent the PEM of a particular WC are not
necessarily complex. The reader should keep in mind that the only reason
that these models are necessary is to understant the interactions between
the physical C3 system and the commanders within the organization. The
decision variables of the commanders are relatively simple at each instant
of time since they relate to:
(a) positions and motions of assets
(b) turning on or off sensors and other surveillance assets
(c) communications with other commanders
(d) timing of above decisions.
Ba-d s pon private coQru4njcations with Dr, A.H. Levis, Mr. J.G. Wohl and
Gen. Cushman, U.s. Army (fret.)
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The process by which decisions are arrived at are complex; but these are
carried out in the mind of the commander who is modeled as an expert in
this decision-making task. The only degradation in his decision making
is due to the C3 system that may give him too much or too little information,
delayed information, conflicting information, and only partial information
about the enemy's assets and their motion.
Therefore, the PEM's must be stochastic and dynamic models, and must
have a feedback mechanism. Thus, they cannot be purely prescriptive and
open-loop (e.g. modifications of linear programming algorithms); rather
they must represent adequately the cybernetic feedback process of Fig. 5.1.*
The successful human control and decision models developed to date I 9 ]
to [ 11] provide a conceptual framework on which future modeling efforts
may expand upon, but they cannot address in their current form the complexity
of the C2 tactical decision process of an individual WC.
Individual models of WC's are necessary, but by no means sufficient, to
provide guidance in structuring the architecture of the physical C3 system.
A good model of the PEM of an individual WC would clarify the detailed
tactical information that he needs to carry out his decision process and
perhaps quantify the efforts of innacurate and/or untimely tactical infor-
mation upon the quality of his decisions. However, the physical C3 system
cannot be designed to serve only one WC, but the collection of the WC's
that operate as a team in the overall C2 organization. A particular bit
of tactical information is often necessary for many WC's, perhaps for dif-
ferent reasons. Thus, in order to understand the interactions between the
distributed C2 organization and the physical C3 system architecture one must
understand the interactions of the collective decision processes of the C2
organization.
6. Modeling the C2 Organization
The interactions among different WC's are best illustrated if one assumes
that the assets controlled by one WC have warfare capabilities in more than
one warfare area.
This is in philosophical agreement with the central hypotheses proposed by
Simon in [ 7 ],p.65: "A man, viewed as a behaving system is quite simple.
The apparent complexity of his behavior over time is largely a reflection
of the complexity of the environment in which he finds himself". Indeed one
could argue that a "good" C3 system should not increase the complexity of the
true tactical scenario through the information that it transmits to the WC's.
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The simplest example is a modern destroyer whose position and motion
is controlled* by the ASWC. The destroyer has sensor and weapons capabilities
that impact AAW, ASUW, and electronic warfare (EW), Hence, its position
impacts the problem faced by the AAWC and the ASUWC as well as that of the
EW coordinator. The fact that, say, the AAWC does not have C2 authority
over the motion of that particular destroyer does not preclude him from
using the AAW sensors and weapons of that particular destroyer. In
particular, the decisions of the ASWC as reflected in the position of
that particular destroyer (which is the output of the PEM of the ASWC)
will certainly impact the decision process of the AAWC. Hence, to fully
utilize all available resources for each warfare area, the WC's must
somehow coordinate their tactical decisions.
This need for coordinating the multiwarfare sensor and weapon capa-
bilities of a particular asset creates new requirements for the physical
C3 system. Clearly the WC's must communicate among themselves so as to
coordinate their tactical decisions. In addition, the C3 system must
deliver to each WC tactical information, differing in detail, about
assets not directly under his C2 authority.
Extensivej-oint team training of the WC's and joint centralized mission
planning prior to execution are the key elements that will determine the
success of a particular military mission. The tactical warfare expertise
of a particular commander is a necessary but not a sufficient ingredient
for a smoothly functioning C2 organization. The different WC's must,through
team training, become aware of the tactical problems faced by the other
WC's so that tactical coordination takes place, without having to always
resort to the superior commander for conflict resolution ( a process
that introduces delays, increases communications, and disrupts the superior
commander from accomplishing his own global objectives).
For the reasons outlined above one can argue that the effect of team
training** of the WC's turns a "team of experts" into an "expert team of
experts (ETOE)".
Within the C2 team context, the decisions of one WC impact the decisions
of another, and vice-versa. Thus, we cannot simply model each WC by only
his detailed PEM. Rather, we must augment his problem solving process by
including yet another model that captures his interactions and decision-
coordination with the other commanders.
We therefore postulate that as a result of team training each commander;
(a) retains his principal expert model (PEM) which models his
individual tactical expertise in solving problems in his
particular warfare area, and
*See example 2 in Section 1.
**Team training is not unique to the military. The most familar example
is the training of athletes in an All-Star team,
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(b) develops a set of mutual expert models (MEM); each MEM
represents a suitably aggregated version of the PEM of
each other commander.
The relationship between the PEM's and MEM's is illustrated abstractly in
Figure 6.1 for two interacting commanders. Prior to team training the
expertise of each commander is captured in their respective PEM's, denoted
by PA and PB respectively. As a consequence of team training Commander A
develops a MEM denoted by MBA which represents an aggregated version of
PB' the PEM of Commander B. Consistent with the cognitive limitations
discussed in Section 5 we cannot expect the mutual model MB to have
the same complexity and detail as the principal model PB* Bn a similar
fashion, through joint team traning Commander B develops a MEM denoted
by MAB which represents an aggregated version of PA, the PEM of Commander A,
The mutual expert models do provide the common view of the global
tactical situation between the two commanders, and capture all important
variables and decisions that must be coordinated. The MEM's are necessary
to define the common language (and protocols) by which the two commanders
communicate and coordinate their tactical decisions,
A diagram of a hypothetical C2 organization is shown in Figure 6,2.
Commander A can be thought as the superior commander, while commanders
B and C can be thought as warfare commanders each controlling their
assigned multiwarfare capable assets. Each commander is characterized
by his PEM (denoted by PA, PB', and PC in Figure 6.2) and a set of PEM's
(denoted by MBA, MCA MAB, MCB' MAC and MBC in Figure 6,2), As illustrated
in Figure 6.2 the coordinated decisions of the C2 organization, related
to the positioning and even the tactical reassignment of an asset from one
WC to another, can only be carried out on the basis of the MEM!s.
A mathematical model of the C2 organization decision process should
include both the principal expert model (PEM!s) and the mutual expert models
(MEM's) of the different commanders, since both are necessary to describe
the individual decisions of the commanders and the coordination by which
the commanders have arrived at their decisions. Since both the PEM's and the
MEM's are strongly influenced by information provided by the physical C3
system (through the surveillance assets and communications assets), such
models of the C2 decision processes may be used to define the suitable
architecture(s) of the C3 system.
The PEM's would define the nature and level of detail of the tactical
information needed by each commander to properly utilize his expertise
in his own particular area. It would also define the tactical communications
requirements necessary so that the particular commander can effectively
exercise C2 authority over the assets assigned to him and directly controlled
by him.
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The MEM's would define the nature and minimal level of aggregation
of the information necessary to be common knowledge to all commanders
in the C2 organization so that suitably coordinated decisions can be made
related to the location, motion, and even reassignment of the assets. This
in turn would specify the subset of tactical information* that must be
common information to all appropriate commanders in the C2 organization.
Also it would define the requirements of the communications network that
must link the commanders so that they can reach coordinated decisions.
It is the author's opinion that most military organizations are indeed
informally arranged in the structure suggested by the expert team of experts
concept, at least as far as their communications requirements are concerned,
Cooperating commanders at the same level of C2 authority and responsibility
communicate among themselves using distinct telephone circuits or radio
frequencies. Different communication channels are established to allow
a commander to communicate with his assets. This semi-hierarchical
structure acts as a buffer on the amount of information flow that reaches
the top levels of the C2 organization; it is also consistent with the
overall doctrinal requirement that subordinate commanders must report
evaluated information to their superiors. One can make the plausible
argument that the aggregated tactical information is that necessary to
support the MEM's of the cooperating commanders.
The challenge is, at least in the author's opinion, to suitably
structure the flow of relevant tactical information and its storage in
(redundant) distributed data bases to support the needs of both individual
commanders and of the entire C2 organization. Advances in electronic
sensors and computers, have drastically increased the amount of tactical
data available at each instant of time, Tactical communications limita-
tions preclude the indescriminate transmission of this data to the computer
data bases that support different commanders decisions, also, the com-
munication requirements to solely keep the information in the distributed
data bases consistentis prohibitive. Finally, the cognitive limitations
of humans in absorbing new information must be observed.
7. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have discussed the need for mathematical models
that describe;
(1) the tactical decision making process of an
individual commander, and
(2) the collective coordinated decision process
of commanders operating within a C2 organization
*An example of common information is the geographical display of platforms
by the NTDS systems in Naval battle groups.
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Such models are needed if one wants to define the architecture of the
physical C3 system whose function is to provide
(a) suitably aggregated tactical information to
specific commanders,
(b) means for reliable tactical communication between a
commander and his assets,
(c) means for communication between commanders for
coordination purposes, and
(d) mechanism for storing consistent information in
diverse redundant distributed data bases.
The contribution of this paper lies in viewing the C organization
as an "expert team of experts". Each individual commander is viewed as
an expert in his warfare area, in the sense that given a detailed
tactical situation he is capable of directing the assets under his
direct control to accomplish the mission objective assigned to him
by his superior commander. We abstract the commander individual expertise
by defining his Principal Expert Model (PEM),
We argue that a well-functioning C2 organization is more than a team
of individual experts. We postulate that as a consequence of joint mission
planning, joint C2 team training, and availability of common tactical
information, each commander develops a mental picture which represents an
aggregated version of the tactical decision making process of his fellow
commanders with whom he must coordinate, exploit multiwarfare capable assets,
and compete for scarse resources. This is abstracted by defining for each
commander a set of Mutual Expert Models (MEM's); each MEM is an aggregated
version of other commanders PEM's and is a consequence of joint team train-
ing; in thismanner the "team of experts" gets. transformed into an "'expert
team of experts".
The physical C3 system must have the physical elements and the architec-
ture to provide to each commander the necessary tactical information to
support both his PEM and his MEM's, Otherwise, one would expect a deteriora-
tion of the quality of
(a) individual warfare tactical decisions via the PEMIs, and
(b) collective coordinated C organization decisions via the
MEM's.
A great deal of fundamental and applied research is needed so as to
develop scientific methodologies related to constrained distributed decision
making problems of this nature before a more concrete set of theories and
quantitative results can be obtained.
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FIGURE 2.2 Interactions between the C
process and the C3 system
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